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The public pension systems of the G7 countries were established in an era when the number of 
contributors far outweighed the number of beneficiaries. Now, for each beneficiary there are fewer 
contributors, and this trend is projected to accelerate. To evaluate the prospects for these economies we 
develop an overlapping generations model where growth is endogenously fueled by investments in 
physical and human capital.  We analyze individuals’ behavior when their expectations over their length 
of life are rational or myopic and examine whether policies exist that can offset the effects of aging, 
should they be adverse.  We find that while perfectly anticipated aging is welfare improving and does not 
threaten the solvency of public pension systems, myopia worsens welfare, puts pension systems at risk, 
and cannot be easily remedied by public policy.  
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"Population aging is the single most consistent pressure on federal income security 
spending, as public pension spending continues its relentless upward climb."  
Douglas Young, former Canadian Minister of Human Resources Development 
I.  Introduction  
 The public pension systems of the G7 countries were established in an era when the number of 
contributors to the pay-as-you-go schemes far outweighed the number of beneficiaries.  Over the post-
World War II period the systems have matured and the populations of the G7 countries have aged as 
longevity has risen and birth rates have fallen.  Now, for each beneficiary there are fewer contributors, 
and this downward trend is projected to accelerate. To maintain benefit levels, tax rates and/or 
productivity growth will have to rise.  Evaluating the future of the systems, individual contributors 
express grave doubts that they will receive as they did give (Saito, 1998).  
 To evaluate the prospects for these economies we develop an overlapping generations model in 
which individuals face uncertainty over their longevity, growth is endogenously fueled by individuals’ 
investments in physical capital, and individual and government investment in human capital.  All retirees 
receive public pension benefits, funded in a pay-as-you-go manner.  We analyze individuals’ behavior 
and social welfare when expectations over length of life are rational or adaptive (myopic).  Using 
simulations of our model in which parameter values are drawn from the individual economies of the G7, 
we examine for each of the economies and for each of the expectations assumptions whether policies exist 
that can offset any adverse effects of aging.  Further, we examine how policies aimed at a specific target 
group, e.g. the elderly or the young, affect current and future welfare of the economy as a whole.   
 Our model is similar in construct to Docquier and Michel (1999) and Kaganovich and Zilcha 
(1999), which also examine the effects of the public funding of pensions and education on economic 
growth.1 We, however, as in Glomm and Kaganovich (2002), take the constraints of the public pension 
system (benefits are determined as a replacement rate on wages, so benefits determine taxes) explicitly 
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into account in our analysis.  Thus we assume that the government, effectively, faces two budget 
constraints, a public pension constraint and an education constraint, rather than a unified constraint with 
the explicit tradeoff assumed (more for public pensions implies less for education).  Kaganovich and 
Zilcha focus on the trade-off between education and public pension spending absent an aging population.   
Docquier and Michel incorporate population growth to model a transitory demographic shock, whereas 
we model a demographic transition.  Our model differs from these and other studies, such as Auerbach et 
al. (1989) and Hviding and Mérette (1998), in that we incorporate uncertainty regarding length of life; 
thus allowing us to determine the importance of expectations regarding longevity.     
 Our model differs from previous studies of myopia and public pensions in that we are not 
attempting to determine the optimal structure of the public pensions given myopia, as in Feldstein (1985) 
and Hu (1996).  Our work takes the current systems in the G7 countries as given, examines the effects of 
myopia on economic growth and welfare, and looks for policies to ameliorate those effects, if adverse. 
 Our findings suggest that perfectly anticipated population aging may be beneficial to the 
economy as a whole and does not pose a threat to the solvency of the public pension system. Greater 
longevity induces higher rates of saving for retirement, whereas declining population growth increases 
human capital expenditures per child.  These effects offset the negative effects of the higher tax rate that 
is necessary to maintain a given stream of public pension benefits.  As a result the growth rate of output 
per worker rises, and with it, welfare.2  Nonetheless, in nearly every country, aggregate saving declines 
resulting in a reduction in the growth rate of aggregate output.3  
 When agents are myopic, both social welfare and growth are adversely affected because taxes rise 
but the positive longevity effect on saving is absent.  Any policy targeted at retirees, e.g., to maintain their 
standard of living over their individually unanticipated longer lives, will exacerbate the problem because 
taxes to fund such a program will further reduce saving.  Policies directed at the very young, such as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 For a review of the literature relating to public pensions and education, see Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999). 
2  In contrast, Turner et al. (1998) find that aging reduces the growth rate of GNP per capita. 
3 Most studies of aging focus on aggregate saving and find that aging reduces the saving rate.  See, for example, 
Auerbach et al. (1989), Hviding and Mérette  (1998), Masson and Tryon (1990), and Roseveare et al. (1996). 
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higher expenditures on public education, may generate positive growth effects but will not benefit the 
initial generation of retirees, as the effects are felt only with a lag.  For such policies to offset the effects 
of both myopia and aging, they must be put in place prior to the onset of aging.  Thus, myopia, not aging 
per se, is the biggest threat to public pension system viability. 
 
II.  The Model 
 The model developed below is an application of Pecchenino and Pollard (2002)4 and is similar to 
that of Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999). There is an infinitely lived economy composed of finitely lived 
individuals, firms, and a government.  A new generation is born at the beginning of each period and lives 
for at most three periods: youth, working age, and retirement.  At each period t, N(t) identical agents of 
generation t enter the workforce.  The working age population grows at the rate n(t). 
Consumers 
At date t, agents in the first period of their lives, the young, neither consume nor produce.  They 
are endowed with one unit of time that they combine inelastically with resources provided by their 
parents, e(t), and the government, eg(t), to develop their human capital, ht+1(t+1).  Agents in the second 
period of their lives, the workers, supply their effective labor, the product of their one unit of time and 
their human capital developed in youth, inelastically to firms.  In return, they receive wage income, 
w(t)ht(t) from which they pay a pension tax, τ(t), and a school tax, ω(t). They also may receive bequests, 
B(t), from their parents, which are tax free.  Their disposable income is divided between funding their 
children’s human capital development, e(t), their current consumption, ct(t), and saving, s(t), for their 
consumption when retired, ct(t+1).  Agents in the final period of their lives, the retirees, supply their 
savings, s(t-1), inelastically to firms and consume their public pension benefits, T(t), and the return to 
their savings, (1+ρ(t))s(t-1). With probability p(t-1) an agent who worked during period t-1 will live 
throughout the retirement period, and with probability (1-p(t-1)) the agent will die at the onset of 
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retirement.  Agents may form expectations of living into retirement rationally or adaptively (myopically).  
Rational expectations means that working-age agents know their probability of dying at the onset of 
retirement; they have perfect foresight.  Adaptive expectations means that a working-age individual 
assumes that his life expectancy is a convex combination of the actuarial forecast, p(t), the life expectancy 
of  his parents’ generation, p(t-1), and possibly the life expectancy of his grandparents’ generation, p(t-2).  
Let )(ˆ tp  be the member of generation t’s assessment of life expectancy.  If an agent dies at the onset of 
retirement, his saving is bequeathed to the members of generation t, )1())](1/())(1[()( −++= tstnttB ρ .   
Personal saving in this model is the equivalent of the sum of the occupational “second pillar” and 
the personal “third pillar” of retirement security.  This is because, in the context of this model, a defined-
contribution occupational pension plan will earn the same return as private saving.  Thus, as long as the 
defined contribution is less than or equal to what agents would choose to save absent the program, 
combining these two pillars has no affect on the behavior of the model.  
For tractability, let the preferences of a representative worker at time t be represented by 
.ln))1(1(ln)(ˆln 1 1)+(thtn +  1)+(tctp + (t)c = U tttt +++δ     (1) 
Parents get utility from consumption and from educating their children; the value of this education is 
summarized by the child’s human capital.  This utility is derived from an altruistic link between parent 
and child rather than any personal return they may reap from their investment or other strategic motive 
(see Cremer et al., 1992).  This inter vivos bequest motive encompasses the lifetime bequest motive.  
Since agents do not know when they will die, additional unintentional bequests may be forthcoming.  
Parental and government investments are both essential for human capital formation.  If a parent 
invests e(t) and the government invests eg(t), then the child’s human capital will be 
)t(g)t(
t1t
21 )t(e)t(e)1t(h θθ=++      (2)  
where the parameters θ1(t) and θ2(t)  measure the elasticity of parental and government expenditures on 
human capital, respectively.  This modeling of educational attainment follows Hanushek’s (1992) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4   Derivations for this model follow those for Pecchenino and Pollard (2002).  We direct the reader there for a more 
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achievement function.  Parental, e(t), and governmental expenditures, eg(t), and the efficiency of those 
expenditures, θ1(t) and θ2(t), matter for human capital development.  The utility a parent receives from his 
dependent children’s human capital is )1(ln))1(1( 1 +++ + thtn tδ ; δ  is the discount factor. 
The representative agent takes as given his human capital, wages, return on saving, the pension 
and school tax rates, public pension benefits, bequests, and government expenditures on education.  The 
agent then chooses saving and education expenditures to maximize lifetime utility as given by equation 
(1) subject to (2) and the following budget constraints 
)())1(1()())1(1()())()(1)(()()( tBtptetntsttthtwtc tt −−+++−−−−= ωτ    (3) 
 )+T(t + ))s(t)+(t+(1 = )+(tct 111 ρ          (4) 
where constraint (3) encompasses the assumption that bequests are allocated equally across all members 
of a generation so that the bequest-dependent wealth distribution is uniform, as in Hubbard and Judd 
(1987).  This assumption allows us to conduct a representative agent analysis, and restricts uncertainty to 
the timing of death alone. 
The first-order conditions for this problem, with respect to s(t) and e(t), respectively, are 
0
)1(
))1(1)((ˆ
)(
1 =+
+++−
tc
ttp
tc tt
ρ      (5) 
 0
)()(
1 1 =+−
tetct
δθ .      (6) 
Firms 
The firms are perfectly competitive profit maximizers that produce output using the production function 
Y(t) = αα −1)()()( tHtKtA , α ∈ (0, 1).  K(t) is the capital stock at t, which depreciates fully in the 
production process.  H(t) is the effective labor input at t, H(t) = N(t)ht(t), where N(t) is labor hours.  A(t)> 
0 is a productivity scalar.  The production function can be written in intensive form  
 αα )t(k)t(h)t(A)t(y 1t −=       (7) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
detailed discussion of the underlying assumptions, etc.   
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where y(t) is output per worker and k(t) is the capital labor ratio. 
 Firms take the wage, w(t), and rental rate, R(t), as given.  They hire effective labor and capital up 
to the point where their marginal products equal their factor prices: 
 w(t)= k(ttht)A-(1 t
ααα ))()( −      (8) 
 R(t) = k(tthA(t t
11 ))() −− ααα .     (9) 
The Government 
 The government administers the public pension program and funds education.  It levies 
proportional income taxes, τ(t) and ω(t), on the workers to finance pension and education expenditures, 
respectively. Public pension benefits are specified as a replacement rate on the wages of current workers.  
Thus, )()()1()( thtwttT t−= ξ  where T(t) are the transfers to the retired at date t and ξ(t-1) is the 
replacement rate for retirees in period t, which is set in period t-1.  The tax rate, τ(t), adjusts to ensure that 
public pension benefits equal tax revenues 
 )()()()()(
)(1
)1()1()(
)(1
)1( thtwtthtw
tn
ttptT
tn
tp
tt τξ =+
−−=+
− .   (10) 
Solving equation (10) for τ(t) yields 
)(1
)1()1()(
tn
ttpt +
−−= ξτ        (11) 
Similarly, total government spending on education must equal total school tax revenues 
)(
)1(1
)( tw(t)h
tn
t = (t)e tg ++
ω .       (12) 
 
The Goods Market 
The goods market clears when the demand for goods equals the supply of goods: 
 )()()()()())(1()())(1()()(
)(1
)1()( 1 tktRthtwtetntetntstctn
tptc t
g
tt +=++++++
−+ −    (13) 
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Substituting equations (3), (4), (8), (9), (11), and (12) into (13), and making use of the fact that by 
arbitrage the return on capital must equal the return on saving, 
(t) + 1 = R(t) ρ         (14) 
yields 
 s(t-1)=(1+n(t))k(t).       (15) 
 
III.  Equilibrium 
Definition:  A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of prices and taxes 
∞
0=t(t)} (t), (t), {w(t), ωτρ , a sequence of allocations ∞=+ 0)}1(),({ ttt tctc and a sequence of human and 
physical capital stocks, ∞=0)}(),({ tt tkth , )0(k , 0)0(0 >h given, such that given agents’ expectations 
regarding longevity, and given these prices, allocations, and capital stocks, agents’ utility is maximized, 
firms’ profits are maximized, the government budget constraints are satisfied, and markets clear.  
Substituting equations (2)-(4), (8), (9), (11), (12), (14) and (15) into the first order conditions 
given by equations (5) and (6) results in the following set of difference equations in k(t+1), e(t) and 
predetermined variables. 
 01 
)1+k(t)t()1( + )1t(n1
)t(pˆ       =−


 −++ Λα
ξα      (16) 
and 
01
)t(e
 1 =− Λ
δθ
       (17) 
where 
)]1()][(1[                                             
))11)]1([)(
)(1
)1()1()( )1()1)(1(1
+++−
−−

 −−−


 −+
−−−=Λ −−−
tke(t)tn
k(t(te)e(ttp1+)(1t
tn
ttp1tA )-(1tgt 2 ααθαθααωξ
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IV.  The Analytics of Growth 
The following results are for the balanced growth specification of the model.  Similar results hold 
for the steady-state model specification.  All proofs are available from the authors on request.  
 
Proposition 1: Assume all parameter values are time independent, so x(t) = x for all t and for all 
parameters x.  Then, economies with higher school taxes, ω, will have higher growth rates if ωω >ˆ , 
where ( )[ ].)1()1()1/(1ˆ 2 ααξθω pnp −+−+−=  
 
The school tax rate, ω, represents the marginal cost of public education while the marginal benefit 
to the taxpayer, ,ωˆ is the marginal increase in income during one’s working years, discounted by the 
marginal efficiency of the government’s educational input, θ2.  If ωω >ˆ , agents receive a positive income 
effect from an increase in the school tax rate, leading to increases in saving and investment in one’s 
children’s human capital.  If ωω <ˆ , both saving and human capital investment fall.  Thus, as Hanushek 
and Kim (1996) suggest, the economic benefits from education are higher the higher is the quality of the 
education, here measured by θ2. 
 If the economy is not on a balanced growth path then increases in the school tax from a 
suboptimal level toward a growth-maximizing level can have growth-increasing effects if the positive 
human capital effect tomorrow exceeds the negative physical capital effect today.   
The following two propositions examine how economic growth is affected by changes in the two 
demographic parameters: expected longevity, pˆ , and the population growth rate, n.  A rise in pˆ  affects 
growth through three channels.  The expectation of a longer life increases saving for retirement (longevity 
effect).  A longer lifespan reduces bequests (bequest effect) and a longer lifespan increases the tax rate 
required to fund public pension benefits (public pension effect), as shown in equation (11).  The first 
effect raises the economic growth rate while the latter two lower it.   
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A decrease in n also has bequest and public pension effects.  A decline in n results in a rise in bequests 
received by each worker but raises the pension tax rate, a shown in equation (11).  A fall in the population 
growth rate raises educational expenditures per child (the education effect) and raises saving per worker 
(family size effect).   All but the public pension effect raise the growth rate of the economy. 
 
Proposition 2: Economies in which expected longevity, pˆ , is higher have higher growth rates if the 
longevity effect dominates the bequest and public pension tax effects. 
 
If agents expect to live longer, then, all else equal (including the age of retirement), they consume 
a higher proportion of their saving and leave less to their children.  This negative bequest effect reduces 
expected income for working-age agents, reducing saving.  Since pension taxes increase as longevity 
rises, income while working falls, compounding the negative bequest effect.  The tax effect would be 
greater if labor supply were elastic, as some agents would choose to work less in response to the higher 
taxes.  On the other hand workers expecting a longer lifespan increase their saving.  If the longevity effect 
is dominant, physical capital accumulation and the equilibrium growth rate will rise.   
When the increase in longevity is unexpected only the negative bequest and public pension 
effects remain.  For  example, suppose at date t agents plan for the future expecting an unchanged 
demographic structure.  If they live longer than expected, their saving will be inadequate to fund their 
longer life at the anticipated level of consumption. That is, their consumption will be lower than it would 
have been had they anticipated a higher probability of living into old age.  Further, the bequests they leave 
to their children will be smaller, leaving them with less income.  Their children’s income is further 
reduced by the rise in public pension taxes as a result of the increased longevity.  Even one generation of 
unexpectedly long-lived agents can have permanent effects on the height of the growth path, if not on the 
long-run equilibrium rate of growth. 
 
Proposition 3:  Economies with lower population growth rates, n, have higher growth rates if the sum of 
the education and family size effects is positive and exceeds the public pension effect. 
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 With fewer children, education expenditures per child are higher.  In addition, the bequest each of 
these children receives is higher.  There are, however, two competing income effects. The family size 
effect is the standard Solow growth model effect of a lower population growth rate: higher per capita 
saving.  This positive effect is countered by a negative income effect, the public pension effect.  Public 
pension taxes are now higher to compensate for the smaller pool of taxpayers relative to retirees.  If the 
education, bequest, and family size effects exceed the public pension effect, then economies with lower 
population growth rates will have higher equilibrium growth rates.  If the tax effect dominates, a reduced 
population growth rate may lead to reductions in economic growth and social welfare, even without the 
added complication of longer lived elderly.  
 
V.  Simulations:  System Sustainability and Social Welfare 
In this section we examine the effects of demographic changes, both anticipated and 
unanticipated, on growth and economic welfare.  Social welfare in period t is 
).(ln)]1(1[)(ln))](1/()1([)(ln)( 11 thtntctntptctW ttt +− ++++−+= δν     (18) 
Each generation’s consumption at time t is normalized by the size of the working age generation 
at t, N(t).  The weight given to the young, δ, is the same as the weight parents place on educating their 
children.  We assume that ν > 1; the weight given to the elderly is in excess of their population weight.  
This allows for the initial optimality of a public pension program in an economy that is dynamically 
efficient.5  That ν exceeds unity implies that society as a whole puts greater value on the living standards 
of the elderly than on the living standards of the young or the middle-aged.  That the old have greater 
influence than their population size would suggest is explored by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999).  
This social valuation could result from the voting habits and political activity of the elderly.  Or, it could 
                                                          
5 A public pension system may also be optimal in an economy with generation specific shocks.  Such a system 
would require the possibility of transfers from workers to retirees and vice versa (Rangel and Zeckhauser, 2000).  
Since existing systems do not allow for such transfers, we assume that social welfare considerations prevail. 
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be a reflection of a negative external effect on the welfare of the middle aged and young of low living 
standards of the elderly.  Thus, while the young individually cannot affect this, society as a whole can.  
All these provide a rationale for a public pension system in a dynamically efficient economy. 
We begin by calibrating the model to match the recent growth experiences of each of the G7 
economies. Each period is a generation, set equal to 25 years.  The weight given by parents to the human 
capital development of their children, δ, is 0.98, for all countries, reflecting parental altruism.  The 
additional weight placed on the elderly’s consumption, ν, is 3.0 (our results do not depend on the value of 
this parameter). This assures that the public pension system is initially optimal in all countries.6 There is 
no obvious best estimate for θ2, the elasticity of governmental expenditures on education.  We initially 
assume θ2 =0.8,  high efficiency of governmental expenditures, but also consider θ2=0.1, low efficiency of 
governmental expenditures.  For balanced growth θ1+θ2=1, so our choice of θ2  ties down the value of θ1.  
The initial values for the country specific parameters in the model are given in Table 1.7  The 
share of physical capital, α, for each country is from Bernanke and Gürkaynak (2001).  The school tax 
rate, ω, is the 1995 ratio of public expenditures on all levels of education to GDP (OECD, 2001), adjusted 
for labor’s share in output.  The replacement rate, ξ, is the average public pension benefit as a percent of 
the average gross wage in 1995 (Chand and Jaeger, 1996).  France, Germany, and Italy have the most 
generous public pension systems with replacement rates above 50 percent.  Japan and the United 
Kingdom have the least generous systems with replacement rates below 20 percent. 
The growth rate of the working-age population, n, is given by the growth rate of the population 
aged 20 to 64 between 1970 and 1995.8  Canada had the largest percentage increase in the working-age 
population while the United Kingdom had the smallest. The ratio of the population of retirees to workers 
in 1995 multiplied by the gross growth rate of the working-age population, (1+n), gives the value for p.  
                                                          
6 Because saving, and hence economic growth, is higher in the absence of a pay-as-you-go public pension system, 
over time the optimality of such a system is eliminated unless the weight placed on the elderly is ever increasing. 
7 The equations for growth are set out in an appendix, available from the authors on request. 
8 Population data and projections for all countries are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Database, 
Tables 004 and 094.  Data are based on the July 17, 2003 update. 
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Using these baseline parameter values and setting the growth rate of output per worker at its 
1970-1995 average rate (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002), allows us to determine the value of the 
constant, A, in the production function. We then introduce population aging and re-simulate the model, 
keeping all other parameters at their initial values.   
Aging in our model is the result of two demographic factors: a decline in n and an increase in p.  
Specifically, we assume life expectancy rises beginning with the generation entering the workforce in 
period j: p(j)>p(j-1) and continues for an additional period: p(j+1)>p(j).  Population growth slows 
beginning with the children of generation j: n(j+1)<n(j) and continues with the next generation: 
n(j+2)<n(j+1).  These changes result in a reduction in the size of the working age population relative to 
the retired population. The parameters corresponding to this demographic transition, given in Table 2, are 
based on the demographic projections for 2020 and 2045.  By the second period, the population growth 
rate is negative in all countries except Canada and the United States.  To prevent a collapse of the 
working age population in our model, we assume that the working age population remains constant 
following the two period transition, as does longevity. As the population ages, the pension tax rate, τ, 
rises to maintain the replacement rate as shown in equation (11).  
 
Perfect Foresight 
First, assume that agents have perfect foresight: they know the relevant value of p for their 
generation: )(ˆ tp =p(t).   The combined effect of increasing longevity and declining population growth 
rates results in a rise in saving per worker and human capital investment per child.  These in turn increase 
output per worker as shown in Figure 1.   
Increasing p at t=j has a positive effect on saving in period j, a longevity effect.  In addition, 
generation j’s human capital expenditures per child rise as n(j+1) declines, a positive education effect.  
Both effects boost output per worker in period j+1. 
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In period j+1 longevity continues to rise and the population growth rate continues to decline.  
However, the positive longevity and education effects are now tempered by the negative bequest and 
public pension effects of the rise in p(j) and the fall in n(j+1).  The boost in the growth rate of output per 
worker as a result of the change in demographics in the previous period, in combination with the 
longevity and education effects, ensure a further rise in the growth rate of output per worker in period j+2 
in all countries. 
In period j+2 longevity remains unchanged.  The population of children in this period is now the 
same as the working age population, n(j+3)=0.  For Canada and the United States this is a decline in the 
population growth rate but for the other five countries the growth rate of the population rises, as n(j+2) 
was negative.  Thus, in the United States and Canada human capital expenditures per child continue to 
rise, while in the other five countries the rise in n(j+3) has the opposite effect.  In all countries the 
negative bequest and public pension effects continue.  In Canada the negative effects offset the education 
effect and the per worker growth rate falls slightly.  Only in the United States does the growth rate in 
period j+3 rise.  
In period j+3 there is a negative public pension effect in Canada and the United States as a result 
of the decline in n(j+3), but a positive effect in the other five countries.  Thus, the per worker growth rate 
of output falls slightly in period j+4 in the former two countries and rises in the other five.  At this point 
the demographic transition is complete and the growth rate of output per worker is at its new, higher 
equilibrium. 
A declining population growth rate will reduce the growth rate of aggregate output unless it is 
offset by a rise in the growth rate of output per worker.  Only in Japan and the United Kingdom, is the rise 
in output per worker sufficient enough to produce a rise in the long-run growth rate of aggregate output, 
as illustrated in Figure 1.  In these two countries, greater longevity, in combination with a low 
replacement rate, ξ, causes a rapid rise in saving to fund retirement, driving the rise in the growth rate of 
aggregate output.  
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The importance of the efficiency of government expenditures on education is illustrated by Figure 
2, which shows the results of simulating the model assuming that θ2 =0.1 for all countries.  Lowering the 
estimate of θ2 results in a smaller rise in the growth rate of output per worker.  In Germany and Italy 
output per worker falls relative to the baseline during part of the transition.  The lower θ2 produces a 
decline in aggregate output in all countries. 
The demographic changes affect welfare through their effects on the weight given to each 
generation and on consumption.   The increase in longevity raises the weight placed on the consumption 
of the retired generation and has a positive effect on welfare, as can be seen in equation (18).   The 
decline in the growth rate of the working age population, first reduces the weight placed on human capital 
expenditures on children (a negative effect on welfare); eventually it also increases the weight placed on 
retirees, thus having an ambiguous effect on welfare.  The positive effect of aging on the growth rate of 
output per worker increases consumption and has a positive effect on welfare.  In the long run the positive 
effects dominate and welfare rises regardless of the choice of θ2, as shown in Figure 3. 
In all countries, except the United Kingdom, the initial (period j) negative effect of an increase in 
aging on welfare primarily results from the decrease in the population growth rate n(j+1).  Specifically, 
the middle-aged increase their consumption as the lower population growth rate reduces parental 
expenditures on children, although expenditures per child rise.  The human capital of each child, hj+1(j), 
rises, but the weight given to this generation in the welfare function falls as n(j+1) decreases. The 
increase in consumption by the middle-aged is not large enough to offset this negative effect, and welfare 
in period t=j falls.  Over time, the increase in the growth rate of output per worker, resulting from 
increased physical and human capital per worker, raises consumption and welfare for all generations. 
The decline in n(j+1) is smallest in the United Kingdom.  In this country the effect of the rise in 
p(j) predominates.  The low replacement rate induces a sharp rise in saving given a rise in expected 
longevity.  In period j consumption of the working age population declines as do parental expenditures 
per child.  Human capital per child rises as an increase in government expenditures per child offsets the 
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decline in parental expenditures.  Nevertheless, the decline in the weight given to the young in the welfare 
function and the decline in the consumption of workers result in a drop in welfare.   
 Perfectly anticipated aging raises output per worker and the welfare of future generations.  Yet, 
an aging population results in substantial increases in public pension expenditures.  Table 3 shows the 
share of pension expenditures in output prior to and following the demographic transition. These 
increases are similar to those estimated by Chand and Jaeger (1996) and Roseveare et al. (1996). 
In our model the systems remain economically viable, that is, contributions cover expenditures.  
This result may be affected by our assumption that labor supply is inelastic.  If labor force participation 
rates are sensitive to the tax rate, τ, then as the economy ages labor force participation rates fall as 
workers move, for example, into the informal sector.  Under these circumstances the systems in some 
countries may become insolvent. 
 
Adaptive (Myopic) Expectations 
We next conduct a number of simulations under alternative assumptions on individuals’ 
expectations of their longevity and compare these with the perfect foresight results.  To do so we assume 
that a working-age agent assumes his life expectancy is a convex combination of the actuarial forecast, 
p(t),  the life expectancy of his parents’ generation, p(t-1), and, possibly,  the life expectancy of his 
grandparents’ generation, p(t-2).9  Thus, define  
)3()1()()(ˆ 321 −+−+= tptptptp λλλ ,   where 1,, 321 ≤λλλ  and 213 1 λλλ −−= .   (19) 
We present results for three possible combinations of the λs.  The first specification is 5.021 == λλ : 
individuals place equal weight on the actuarial forecast and the experience of their parents’ generation in 
assessing their own life expectancy.  The second specification is λ2=1. Individuals assess their probability 
of living into retirement as equivalent to that of their parents’ generation.  The third specification is λ3=1.  
                                                          
9  This simple formulation incorporates both myopia and learning.  
 16
Individuals assess their probability of living into retirement as equivalent to that of their grandparents’ 
generation.  In all specifications, upon reaching retirement age, the true p is revealed. 
Myopia is harmful to economic growth, either on a per worker or aggregate basis. This is because 
as longevity increases and this increase is not taken into account, agents do not save adequately for their, 
unanticipated, longer lives.10  In the terminology of Proposition 2, the longevity effect disappears and 
only the negative income and bequest effects remain.11  Because, in our model, p stabilizes after two 
periods, a myopic economy’s growth rate converges to the perfect foresight long-run equilibrium value.   
Welfare in the initial period, t=j, is higher under myopia than under perfect foresight, as shown in  
Figure 4.  The failure of workers to recognize an increase in longevity results in a shift in the allocation of 
income away from saving and toward current expenditures, relative to perfect foresight.  Parental 
expenditures on children, as well as own consumption, rise.  Since the initial generation of retirees are 
unaffected, welfare unambiguously rises.  Although the rise in education expenditures in period j has a 
beneficial effect on output in the next period, it cannot offset the negative effect of the decline in saving.  
The fall in output in j+1 and lower bequests relative to perfect foresight results in a decline in the working 
age population’s own consumption expenditures, and their expenditures on education.  Also, the retired 
generation now reduces its consumption relative to the baseline due to the lack of adequate saving.  
Welfare falls and continues to fall, as shown in Figure 4, until the demographic transition is fully 
incorporated into individuals’ saving behavior.  Thereafter, the difference between welfare under myopia 
and perfect foresight narrows.  The lower saving of the myopic generations leads to permanent decline in 
welfare relative to perfect foresight.  The greater the degree of myopia, the greater is the loss in welfare.  
The extent to which myopia results in a reduction in welfare varies across countries.  The greatest 
reduction in welfare occurs in Germany and the smallest reduction in the United States. 
                                                          
10  In our model, myopic individuals save for retirement, but their savings are inadequate given the increase in p.  
This is different from Feldstein (1985) and Hu (1996) in which myopic agents save nothing for retirement.   
11 These results would be the same if agents had rational expectations, but the longevity projections upon which they 
based their savings decisions proved to be too low. 
 17
Myopia is often given as a reason for the existence of public pension systems.  Yet, Feldstein 
(1985) showed that even if everyone in the economy is myopic, it still may be optimal to have no public 
pension system.  A similar result follows from our model.  As Figure 5 shows, the long-run deviation of 
welfare under myopia from perfect foresight is greater with a public pension system than without one. In 
addition, the short-run gain from myopia is higher in the absence of a public pension system.  The 
decrease in saving of the myopic generations relative to perfect foresight is higher in the presence of a 
public pension system, while the increase in expenditures on one’s children is lower.  Both effects 
produce a lower growth rate, relative to perfect foresight, in an economy with a public pension system. 
 Japan is the country in our study that has already experienced substantial aging as a result of both 
a sharp drop in the growth rate of the working age population and a rise in longevity.  The growth rate of 
aggregate output in Japan has fallen when comparing the periods 1950-1975 and 1975-2000.  This decline 
is consistent with either myopia or a low θ2.  The growth rate of output per worker has also fallen in 
Japan, in contrast to the prediction of our model.  This difference could be explained by the effect on 
growth of the rebuilding of the capital stock in the early postwar period. 
 
School taxes 
Faced with a myopic population, is there any means available to a government to effect higher 
rates of saving?  In our model, any forced saving plan, such as government-imposed mandatory pensions, 
would have the effect of reducing an individual’s saving one-to-one (or more than one-to-one if the return 
on government pensions exceeds the return on an individual’s own saving).  Thus, to achieve an increase 
in saving, government mandates would have to cause individuals to save in excess of their desired 
amount. While this may make them better off in an ex post sense, it will not make them better off ex ante.    
Evidence from the Australian superannuation funds (the privatized portion of its pension system) 
provides support for the argument that governments are unable to force an increase in saving.  In the first 
five years after contributions to the system became mandatory, the $110 billion in accumulated assets 
were mostly offset by borrowings (The Economist, 1998). 
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If the government increases the school tax prior to the onset of aging, individuals are forced to 
save, in terms of their children’s human capital, but do not view paying the tax as forced saving.  This tax 
increase generates improvements in growth and social welfare.12  Figure 6 shows the effects of a 10 
percent increase in the school tax rate on lifetime utility when myopia is most severe (λ3=1) and θ2=0.8.  
The increase in welfare is lowest in Japan and highest in the United Kingdom.  All other countries fall 
within these ranges.  
The value of θ2 is crucial to these results.  When ω is increased, income of the working age 
population initially falls and so agents reduce their saving and their expenditures on human capital.  If the 
efficiency of government expenditures on education is sufficiently high, then human capital and hence 
output will rise.  Moreover, this rise in human capital expenditures will more than offset the decline in 
consumption of the working age population, resulting from the higher tax, and hence welfare will rise.  As 
Proposition 1 indicates, the lower is θ2 the lower is the optimal ω.  In Canada, when θ2=1 the optimal 
school tax rate is below the initial tax rate even prior to the demographic transition.  Any increase in the 
tax rate lowers welfare.  In France and Italy welfare declines as the optimal school tax rate following the 
demographic transition is below the new tax rate.  
If agents view parental and governmental expenditures on education as perfect substitutes then 
any attempt by the government to increase saving by raising the school tax rate will fail.  Parents will 
reduce their expenditures on their children in line with the rise in government education expenditures. 
 
Trust Fund 
Another way to handle myopia is through the use of a trust fund.  The value of a trust fund in 
period t is the difference between revenues and expenditures of the public pension system and the gross 
return on any accumulated balances.  The trust fund is equivalent to government savings:  
).1())](1/())(1[()()())](1/()1()1([)()()()( −++++−−−= tstntthtwtnttpthtwtts gttg ρξτ     (21) 
                                                          
12 If the rational expectations longevity projections proved too low, no such policy would be possible. 
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Now )())](1/()1()1([)( ttnttpt γξτ ++−−= , where )(tγ is the increase in the public pension tax rate to 
support pre-funding of benefits.  Equation (21) then can be rewritten as 
)1())](1/())(1[()()()()( −+++= tstntthtwtts gtg ργ .     (22)   
The capital stock at time t is now a combination of private saving, s(t-1), and public saving, sg(t-1).  So 
the goods market clearing equation (15) become s(t-1) = [1+n(t)]k(t) - sg(t-1).   
The trust fund system can be set up in two ways.  The first is to increase τ(t) (relative to the no 
action policy) by setting γ(t)>0 in the periods in which myopia results in an underestimation of longevity 
and lower τ in the next period(s) without changing ξ.  For example, when λ2=1, τ(j) and τ(j+1) rise while 
τ(j+2) and possibly τ(j+3) fall.  The increase in τ  reduces private saving both in terms of physical and 
human capital, as well as consumption expenditures of the affected working-age generations.  The decline 
in private saving lowers consumption of the retired generation.  All of these effects result in a reduction in 
welfare for the duration of the policy.  Nevertheless, the physical capital stock rises, because government 
saving more than offsets the decline in private saving.  As a result, welfare eventually rises once the trust 
fund is exhausted.  
The second method is to increase both τ(t) and ξ(t) for the myopic generations.  When λ2=1, τ(j) 
and τ(j+1) rise resulting in a two-generation trust fund.  The replacement rates, ξ(j) and ξ(j+1), are 
chosen so that the trust fund is exhausted in period j+1.  The increase in the tax rate and the rise in the 
replacement rate lower private saving by more than the increase in government saving.  Total saving 
declines and future generations are made worse off.  Because of this negative effect on saving, pre-
funding the public pension system lowers welfare in all periods. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
Over a period of several generations the proportion of retirees relative to workers is expected to 
rise as the population growth rate declines and longevity rises.  In the face of this demographic transition, 
we assume that the government attempts to maintain the generosity of the public pension system by fixing 
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the replacement rate at its pre-aging rate.  Given this policy, we examine the effects of aging on growth 
and welfare under alternative assumptions on individuals’ expectations of longevity. 
If individuals fully anticipate increased longevity, and hence increase saving for retirement, then 
while aging generally reduces the growth rate of aggregate output, it need not reduce the growth rate of 
output per worker.  If individuals have perfect foresight and prefer a longer life to a shorter life, aging 
does not reduce welfare in the long run.  This prognosis is in stark contrast to Kotlikoff, Smetters and 
Walliser (2001) and Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1999) who paint an unremittingly bleak portrait of the future 
given the demographic transition.  Their results and ours could be reconciled if they were to revise saving 
behavior to account for myopia (under-saving given incorrect perception of longevity) and its correction 
via learning (perfect foresight) or amelioration via induced human capital investment (school taxes). 
If individuals are myopic, then during the demographic transition the economic growth falls 
relative to perfect foresight.  With myopic expectations the growth rate of the economy will, in the long 
run, match the perfect foresight growth rate.  Welfare receives an initial boost as myopic individuals 
consume more and spend more on their children than the more frugal agents with perfect foresight.  This 
gain is short-lived.  Welfare is lower in all subsequent periods as a result of the lower savings of the 
myopic generations.  These results are lower bounds since we have assumed that the supply of labor will 
not fall when social security taxes rise.  For small changes in taxes this assumption may be reasonable, 
but this is not the case for the large changes in taxes forecast for many countries as they try to maintain 
their public pension systems in the face of population aging. 
Given a myopic population, few policies are available to the government to offset the adverse 
growth and welfare effects.  However, the government can raise the growth rate and welfare by inducing 
saving through human capital development, i.e., raising the school tax rate.  Such a policy, however, must 
be in place prior to the onset of aging.  In addition, the success of such a policy depends on the efficiency 
of government expenditures on education.  If government expenditures are not sufficiently productive 
then raising school taxes will only exacerbate the effects of aging, lowering the output of the economy 
(relative to no increase) and hence lowering welfare. 
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While myopia in our model results from agents’ failure to fully account for changing 
demographics, the effects on saving are similar to models in which consumers fail to adjust to changes in 
fiscal policies.  Poterba (1988), for example, notes that while the U.S. public pension reforms enacted in 
1983 reduced the present value of benefits for young workers, there is little evidence that these changes 
have had any effect on saving behavior.  These results indicate that myopia rather than aging is primarily 
responsible for reducing growth and welfare when countries maintain their pay-as-you-go public pension 
systems as the population ages. 
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Table 1 
Baseline Parameter Values 
Parameter Canada France Germany Italy Japan U.K. U.S. 
α 0.32 0.26 0.31 0.29 0.32 0.25 0.26 
ξ  0.292  0.601  0.520  0.539  0.196  0.175  0.385 
ω 0.091  0.080  0.065  0.063  0.053  0.065  0.067  
n 0.581 0.241 0.177 0.164 0.260 0.114 0.450 
p 0.312 0.318 0.289 0.309 0.290 0.298 0.313 
Annual growth rate 
of output per worker 0.0105 0.0177 0.0129 0.0227 0.0287 0.0167 0.0152 
 
 
Table 2 
Demographic Change  
Working-Age Population:  Growth Rate 
Parameter Canada France Germany Italy Japan U.K. U.S. 
  n(j) 0.581 0.241 0.177 0.164 0.260 0.114 0.450 
n(j+1) 0.235 0.040 -0.054 -0.040 -0.137 0.098 0.233 
   n(j+2) 0.012 -0.077 -0.192 -0.242 -0.242 -0.063 0.131 
Longevity 
Parameter Canada France Germany Italy Japan U.K. U.S. 
  p(j-1) 0.312 0.318 0.289 0.309 0.290 0.298 0.313 
p(j) 0.373 0.376 0.358 0.369 0.428 0.347 0.350 
   p(j+1) 0.452 0.459 0.465 0.509 0.519 0.430 0.431 
 
 
Table 3 
Expenditures on Public Pensions as a Percent of  Output 
 Canada France Germany Italy Japan U.K. U.S. 
Pre-demographic transition 3.9 11.4 8.8 10.2   3.1 3.5 6.2 
Post-demographic transition 9.0 20.4 16.8 19.5   6.9 5.6 12.3 
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